JonasBezzubovas.com

Independent legal research and commentary

Author: Jonas Bezzubovas

  • When Progress Runs Backwards: Turkey and the Uneven History of LGBT Acceptance

    When Progress Runs Backwards: Turkey and the Uneven History of LGBT Acceptance

    It is tempting to imagine social progress as a straight line. A society becomes more tolerant, laws become more liberal, previously marginalised people become more visible, and eventually an old prejudice recedes into history.

    The reality is considerably messier.

    The recent crackdown on LGBT people and organisations in Turkey provides a striking example. In September 2026, Turkish authorities launched a nationwide operation targeting LGBT organisations, activists and some businesses and venues. According to Justice Minister Akın Gürlek, investigations encompassed 162 suspects, nine associations and 13 businesses across 15 provinces. Police raided association offices and other premises, websites and social-media accounts were blocked, and dozens of people were detained or jailed pending trial. Authorities described the operation as “My Family is Safe” and said it was intended to protect children, the family and public order. Human-rights organisations and the Council of Europe’s Commissioner for Human Rights have strongly criticised the crackdown and questioned the use of such justifications for restrictions on civil society and expression.

    The events did not emerge from nowhere. Istanbul Pride has been banned since 2015, and LGBT demonstrations have repeatedly encountered bans, arrests and police intervention. During 2025, which President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan’s government designated the “Year of the Family,” authorities adopted further measures criticised by human-rights organisations as targeting LGBT people. Human Rights Watch reported restrictions on terminology concerning sexual orientation and gender identity and continuing censorship and restrictions on Pride events.

    The September 2026 operation nevertheless represents a significant escalation. Raids extended beyond demonstrations into the organisational infrastructure of LGBT civil society and reportedly included nightlife venues and other workplaces. Access restrictions affected LGBT organisations and media, while subsequent demonstrations against the raids themselves resulted in further detentions.

    At first sight, developments like these appear to contradict the idea that LGBT acceptance has advanced over the past several decades.

    But that contradiction disappears once we abandon the idea that historical change must move smoothly in one direction.

    Progress has more than one timescale

    Imagine a society’s level of LGBT acceptance represented by a hypothetical sequence:

    20 → 30 → 45 → 60 → 70 → 62 → 65

    Someone looking at the entire period sees an enormous long-term increase.

    Someone living through the fall from 70 to 62 experiences a genuine reversal.

    Neither person is mistaken.

    This is an important distinction because phrases such as “LGBT rights are advancing” can accidentally trivialise what happens during periods of regression. Someone whose organisation has been raided, whose demonstration has been prohibited or who has been detained does not experience their situation as an insignificant wobble on an upward graph.

    The backward movement is real.

    What remains uncertain is whether it represents a lasting change in historical direction.

    Progress creates things that are difficult to completely undo

    Social change is not simply a collection of laws.

    It also changes institutions, expectations, relationships and people’s understanding of what is normal.

    Consider what happens when LGBT people become increasingly visible. More people discover that a sibling, colleague, child, neighbour or friend is gay or transgender. Organisations form. Communities acquire physical spaces and cultural traditions. Lawyers develop expertise. Journalists begin covering LGBT issues. Political arguments that once seemed almost unimaginable become familiar.

    A government can change legislation or close an organisation considerably faster than it can erase all of those social consequences.

    This creates something resembling a ratchet—but an imperfect one.

    The ratchet can slip backwards. Sometimes it can slip very far. Rights that seemed secure can disappear, organisations can be dismantled and public attitudes can deteriorate.

    Yet society does not necessarily return to precisely the place from which it started.

    Turkey demonstrates this paradox particularly vividly. The very existence of established LGBT organisations, Pride traditions, community venues, advocacy networks and public protests against repression demonstrates how much social infrastructure developed before the current crackdown. The government’s ability to restrict that infrastructure is evidence of regression; the infrastructure’s existence in the first place is evidence of an earlier transformation.

    Those two realities can coexist.

    Backlash can actually be evidence that something changed

    There is another uncomfortable feature of social change: backlash frequently occurs because a previously marginal phenomenon has become sufficiently visible to provoke organised opposition.

    That does not mean backlash is secretly beneficial. Repression can cause enormous harm, and there is no historical law saying that its victims will eventually prevail.

    But it does mean that backlash and previous progress are not opposites in quite the way they initially appear.

    A movement can progress from being largely invisible, to visible, to institutionally established—and consequently become important enough that opponents organise specifically against it.

    Turkey’s official rhetoric is revealing in this respect. The current campaign has been explicitly framed around protecting “family” and children. Authorities say the measures concern obscenity, prostitution, child protection and public order; rights organisations argue that these concepts are being used to suppress legitimate LGBT civil society and expression.

    Whichever interpretation one adopts, the political conflict itself demonstrates that LGBT visibility has become an established question in Turkish public life rather than something society simply never discusses.

    But there is no guaranteed happy ending

    This is where the metaphor of “winning little battles until the war is won” becomes dangerous.

    History has no automatic victory condition.

    A backlash can last five years. It can last fifty. Institutions can disappear. Generations can grow up under different social conditions. A sufficiently sustained reversal can eventually destroy some of the cultural and institutional gains that initially seemed difficult to undo.

    Nor does every LGBT issue necessarily travel in the same direction. Acceptance of gay and lesbian relationships, same-sex marriage, freedom of association, transgender healthcare, legal recognition of gender, education and questions surrounding children can follow quite different political trajectories.

    There is therefore no single dial labelled LGBT progress that moves neatly forwards and backwards.

    There are dozens of interacting dials.

    History looks different depending on where you stand

    Perhaps the most useful way of thinking about all this is to imagine history operating simultaneously at three scales.

    At the scale of days and months, there are raids, demonstrations, court decisions, elections and policy changes.

    At the scale of years, societies experience political cycles: liberalisation, reaction, polarisation, consolidation and sometimes renewed liberalisation—or further restriction.

    And at the scale of generations, much deeper transformations can become visible.

    The mistake is assuming that movement at one scale tells us automatically what is happening at another.

    Turkey in September 2026 is experiencing a substantial crackdown on LGBT civil society. Calling that merely a temporary bump would go beyond what the evidence can tell us. Nobody yet knows how far the campaign will go, how long it will last, or what its enduring consequences will be.

    But neither does the crackdown erase the historical process that preceded it.

    That gives us a more nuanced version of the idea that began this discussion:

    Progress is cumulative, but it is not inevitable.

    Each period of liberalisation changes the society in which the next conflict occurs. Some of those changes survive subsequent reversals; others do not. Consequently, when another period of change begins, it may begin from a different baseline than the one before it.

    History therefore resembles neither a triumphant march forward nor an endless circle.

    It is closer to a long, irregular path: advances, reactions, settlements, renewed conflicts and occasionally profound reversals—while underneath them, slower changes in culture and institutions may continue accumulating.

    Turkey’s current crackdown belongs to the backward-moving part of that story.

    Whether it eventually becomes a temporary reversal within a longer transformation, or the beginning of a much deeper and more durable change in direction, can only be answered by what happens next.

  • Are Older Places Happier?

    Are Older Places Happier?

    Testing the relationship between age, deprivation and well-being in Britain

    Walk through different parts of Britain and an apparent pattern can be difficult to ignore.

    Many places with conspicuously young populations are dense urban areas: expensive housing, heavy traffic, smaller living spaces, greater population turnover and, in some cases, substantial deprivation. Meanwhile, many older communities are found in smaller towns, rural districts and coastal areas that can appear quieter, greener and more settled.

    It raises an intriguing question:

    Do places with older populations actually tend to be happier?

    And, if they do, is age itself responsible — or are age and happiness both consequences of something else?

    The available evidence suggests that the observation deserves to be taken seriously. But it also shows why a simple conclusion such as “older places are happier because older people are happier” would be misleading.

    The first clue: Britain’s age geography is extraordinary

    The age profile of the UK varies dramatically from place to place.

    According to the 2021 Census, the median age across England and Wales was 40. London was considerably younger, at 35, while the South West had a median age of 44.

    The differences become much larger at local-authority level. Tower Hamlets had a median age of just 30. Nottingham, Cambridge, Oxford and Manchester were all around 31.

    At the other end of the spectrum, North Norfolk’s median resident was 54, Rother’s 53 and East Lindsey’s 52.

    Universities explain part of this pattern, but not all of it. Britain’s major cities attract young adults for education and employment, while many rural and coastal areas contain much larger retired populations.

    The country therefore provides a natural setting in which to ask whether the age of a place is associated with the wellbeing of the people living there.

    There is evidence for the pattern

    An Office for National Statistics analysis of English local authorities provides particularly interesting evidence.

    ONS grouped local authorities according to four measures of personal wellbeing: life satisfaction, happiness, anxiety and whether people felt the things they did in life were worthwhile.

    One cluster contained 74 local authorities that were below the median on all four wellbeing measures.

    Of those authorities:

    • 88% were urban;
    • 62% had a median age of 40 or younger; and
    • 34% were among the more deprived local authorities.

    London was heavily represented: 56% of London’s local authorities fell into this cluster.

    A second cluster, which performed below the median for happiness, life satisfaction and worthwhile feelings, was again disproportionately young and deprived.

    So the geographical pattern is not simply anecdotal. Official statistics have detected an association between poorer wellbeing, younger local populations, urbanity and deprivation.

    But that last sentence contains the central problem.

    All four characteristics occur together.

    Correlation is not explanation

    Imagine plotting every local authority on a graph.

    On one axis is its median age. On the other is its average happiness score.

    If older authorities tend to appear higher on the happiness scale, we have discovered a correlation.

    We have not demonstrated that the age of the population caused the difference.

    A younger area may simultaneously have:

    higher housing costs, more renters, greater population density, more unemployment or economic insecurity, more students, lower home ownership, greater population turnover, different household structures, different health outcomes and greater deprivation.

    An older area may simultaneously have:

    more homeowners, more retirees, lower population density, greater residential stability, more green space and a completely different socioeconomic composition.

    Age could therefore be acting partly as a marker for the type of place being observed.

    This distinction is crucial.

    The proposition we really need to test is not:

    “Are older places happier?”

    It is:

    “After accounting for deprivation, urbanisation, employment, health and other relevant characteristics, is the age structure of a place still associated with its reported wellbeing?”

    That is a much harder and much more interesting question.

    The individual-level evidence complicates the story

    There is another reason not to interpret the geographical relationship too quickly.

    At the individual level, happiness does not simply increase with age.

    ONS research using more than 300,000 UK adults found a broadly curved relationship.

    Happiness and life satisfaction were relatively high among younger adults, declined through adulthood, reached their lowest levels during middle age, and subsequently increased substantially.

    People aged approximately 65–79 reported some of the highest levels of personal wellbeing.

    At still older ages, wellbeing began to decline again.

    In other words, the relationship resembles a distorted U or S-shaped curve rather than a straight line from unhappy youth to happy old age.

    This matters enormously.

    If young people themselves are not uniformly unhappy, yet younger places sometimes record poorer wellbeing, something about the characteristics of those places may be contributing to the association.

    Deprivation is the obvious suspect

    The strongest competing explanation is socioeconomic deprivation.

    Deprivation can affect many of the things that plausibly influence everyday wellbeing: housing, employment, crime, health, environmental quality and financial security.

    England’s official Index of Multiple Deprivation combines seven domains:

    income; employment; education, skills and training; health and disability; crime; barriers to housing and services; and the living environment.

    The 2025 English Indices of Deprivation show that deprivation remains heavily geographically concentrated, although deprived neighbourhoods exist across much of the country.

    Middlesbrough, Birmingham, Hartlepool, Kingston upon Hull and Manchester were among the local-authority districts containing the highest proportions of neighbourhoods in England’s most deprived group.

    Some of those places also have comparatively young populations.

    That creates a classic confounding problem.

    Suppose younger local authorities have lower average happiness.

    Suppose younger local authorities are also more deprived.

    And suppose deprivation independently reduces wellbeing.

    The apparent relationship between age and happiness could therefore actually be substantially a relationship between deprivation and happiness.

    Health introduces another complication

    Health strongly influences subjective wellbeing, and health itself varies dramatically with both age and deprivation.

    ONS Census analysis found substantially better self-reported health in England’s least deprived areas than its most deprived areas.

    Importantly, this difference exists even among young people.

    Among 15–19-year-olds, 64.2% of those living in the most deprived areas reported very good health, compared with 75.9% in the least deprived areas.

    The deprivation gap became considerably larger through middle age.

    This makes it dangerous to treat population age as an isolated explanatory variable.

    Age, health, wealth, employment and geography interact.

    There’s also an ecological fallacy waiting for us

    Perhaps the most important statistical trap is assuming that characteristics of an area necessarily describe the individuals living within it.

    Imagine that a seaside authority has:

    median age: 52
    average happiness: 7.8

    while a city authority has:

    median age: 31
    average happiness: 7.2

    It would be tempting to conclude that the older residents are responsible for the higher score.

    But those figures alone cannot tell us that.

    It is entirely possible that the 30-year-olds living in the older authority are happier than the 30-year-olds living in the younger authority.

    If that happened, the important variable might not be how old you are.

    It might be where and under what conditions you live.

    This is known as the ecological fallacy: relationships observed between populations cannot automatically be assumed to describe relationships between individuals.

    A particularly useful piece of ONS evidence

    ONS has already performed an analysis that demonstrates why age adjustment matters.

    It has published both age-standardised and non-age-standardised local-authority wellbeing estimates.

    Age standardisation asks, approximately:

    What would the comparison between these places look like if their different population age structures were accounted for?

    That provides one way of separating the demographic composition of an area from its underlying wellbeing.

    ONS has also examined correlations between local wellbeing and deprivation.

    These datasets provide the ingredients for a much stronger test than simply comparing a few young cities with a few retirement areas.

    How the hypothesis should actually be tested

    A serious analysis should begin with every comparable local authority rather than selecting conspicuous examples.

    For each authority we would collect:

    Median age

    from ONS population estimates.

    Happiness and life satisfaction

    from the ONS Annual Population Survey personal-wellbeing data.

    Deprivation

    from the relevant national deprivation indices.

    Ideally, additional variables would include population density, urban/rural classification, employment, health, housing affordability, home ownership and student population.

    The first calculation is straightforward:

    median age ↔ happiness

    and separately:

    median age ↔ life satisfaction.

    That establishes the raw geographical correlation.

    The second stage is much more important.

    We then estimate the relationship after accounting for deprivation and the other characteristics.

    Conceptually:

    Wellbeing = age structure + deprivation + urbanity + health + employment + housing + other factors

    If the association with median age remains substantial after those controls, the proposition that there is something independently important about the age structure of communities becomes considerably more interesting.

    If it largely disappears, a different conclusion follows:

    young population was functioning as a proxy for other characteristics of disadvantaged urban areas.

    Either result would be informative.

    Reasons the apparent relationship might survive

    There are plausible mechanisms through which population age structure itself could matter.

    Older populations may have greater residential stability. People may have lived near neighbours for longer, producing stronger community networks.

    Areas dominated by families and older residents may also develop different public spaces, businesses and services from places dominated by transient young adults.

    Retirement removes commuting and employment pressures for some people. Older homeowners may have lower housing costs after paying down mortgages.

    There may also be selection effects: people with sufficient resources can choose to retire to attractive rural or coastal areas.

    In that case, however, the pleasant environment may partly explain the happiness rather than age itself.

    Reasons the hypothesis might fail

    There are equally powerful counterexamples.

    University cities are exceptionally young because thousands of generally healthy young adults arrive every year. Their low median age tells us very little about deprivation.

    Cambridge and Oxford illustrate the problem particularly well: both had median ages around 31 in the 2021 Census.

    Conversely, an ageing population can sometimes result from younger residents leaving an area because employment opportunities are limited.

    Some older coastal communities also experience serious deprivation, poor health and social isolation.

    And among the oldest individuals, average wellbeing eventually declines.

    So neither youth nor age is intrinsically a reliable measure of whether somewhere is flourishing.

    What can reasonably be concluded?

    There is credible evidence for the observation that prompted this investigation:

    some of Britain’s younger urban local authorities also exhibit poorer wellbeing and greater deprivation, while a number of older, less urban authorities perform better on wellbeing measures.

    ONS’s own clustering analysis detected essentially this combination of characteristics.

    But the evidence does not justify the stronger statement:

    “Places are happier because their populations are older.”

    The demographic variable is entangled with deprivation, urbanisation, health, housing, employment and migration.

    Indeed, that may be the more interesting discovery.

    The question may not ultimately be why older people make places happier.

    It may be why Britain has produced a geography in which youth, urbanisation, housing pressure and deprivation so often overlap, while some older populations are concentrated in quieter and more economically secure environments.

    Age may be part of the story.

    Or it may be the clue that leads us to the real one.

    The next test

    The hypothesis can now be made falsifiable.

    Take every UK local authority for which comparable data are available.

    Plot median age against happiness and life satisfaction.

    Measure the correlation.

    Then progressively control for deprivation, health, employment, housing and urbanisation.

    If age continues to predict wellbeing after those adjustments, we have evidence of an independent relationship worth explaining.

    If it does not, then the original observation was still useful — but what it revealed was not an age effect.

    It revealed the socioeconomic geography hiding underneath it.

  • When the Streetlights Lost Their Warmth: What LED Lighting Changed About the Modern City

    When the Streetlights Lost Their Warmth: What LED Lighting Changed About the Modern City

    Modern Society | Urban Life, Technology & the Human Environment

    There was something unmistakable about London at night under the old sodium streetlights.

    The pavement turned amber. Brickwork acquired a warm orange glow. Mist and drizzle caught the light and seemed to hang visibly in the air. Residential streets could have an almost dreamlike quality. Even an otherwise ordinary road sometimes looked strangely inviting.

    Then, gradually, the colour changed.

    Across London and much of Britain, traditional high-pressure sodium (HPS) streetlights have increasingly been replaced by LEDs. There are excellent practical reasons for the transition. LEDs can use less electricity, last longer, be dimmed electronically and direct their light much more precisely. They can also provide much better colour recognition, which has advantages for pedestrians, drivers and CCTV.

    From an engineering perspective, LED streetlighting is an extraordinary improvement.

    But something else changed with it.

    The streets stopped looking quite so warm.

    The Strange Comfort of Sodium Light

    High-pressure sodium lighting has an extremely distinctive appearance. Rather than producing balanced white light, it is dominated by warm yellow and orange wavelengths.

    Its colour rendering is poor by modern standards. Under sodium lighting, blues, greens and reds can become difficult to distinguish accurately. Human faces look unusual. Cars can appear to be different colours from what they actually are.

    Yet the same technological deficiency created an extraordinarily powerful atmosphere.

    Sodium light compressed the visual world into variations of amber, brown, gold and shadow.

    In an old London street—with brick terraces, wet pavement, trees, fog and Victorian architecture—the effect could be beautiful.

    And perhaps part of the reason is remarkably ancient.

    A Streetlight That Looked a Little Like Fire

    There is an obvious visual similarity between sodium lighting and firelight.

    Candles, fireplaces and campfires all produce predominantly warm-looking illumination. High-pressure sodium is not spectrally identical to fire, of course, but psychologically the resemblance is difficult to miss.

    That raises an intriguing question.

    Could humans actually be predisposed to find warm light comforting?

    There is a plausible biological argument, although it shouldn’t be exaggerated into a simple evolutionary story.

    Humans and our ancestors have had a relationship with fire extending extraordinarily far into prehistory. Archaeological evidence for hominin fire use reaches back hundreds of thousands of years and potentially much further, although precisely when fire became habitual remains debated. Recent evidence from Barnham in Suffolk indicates that hominins were deliberately making fire around 400,000 years ago. Other archaeological evidence of hominin interaction with fire extends considerably further back.

    Fire transformed human life.

    It provided warmth, protection, cooking and illumination. Crucially, it also created a place around which people could gather after sunset.

    For enormous stretches of human existence, meanwhile, the basic lighting cycle was nothing like that of a modern city.

    Day meant sunlight.

    Night meant darkness, moonlight—and eventually fire.

    Your Eyes Know When It Is Night

    Light does more than allow us to see.

    It also communicates with the biological systems controlling our circadian rhythms.

    Specialised cells in the retina containing the photopigment melanopsin contribute to regulating the body’s internal clock. This system is particularly sensitive to shorter-wavelength light in roughly the blue-cyan portion of the spectrum.

    Exposure to sufficiently intense light at night can therefore influence circadian timing and melatonin production. The effect depends on considerably more than simply whether a lamp is “blue” or “yellow”: intensity, spectrum, duration, timing and previous light exposure all matter.

    Nevertheless, there is a meaningful biological distinction between warm, low-blue evening illumination and blue-rich white illumination.

    The natural environment itself contains a similar transition. Bright daylight provides powerful broad-spectrum illumination, whereas the visual environment after sunset becomes dramatically darker.

    For most of human history, nobody walked from a sunlit afternoon into a world filled with thousands of powerful white electric lights.

    The modern illuminated city is, biologically speaking, an extremely recent invention.

    But Biology Isn’t the Whole Story

    We should be careful here.

    It would be tempting to say that warm streetlights feel comfortable simply because our prehistoric ancestors sat around campfires.

    Human psychology is rarely that straightforward.

    Much of our response to warm light is almost certainly cultural and learned as well.

    Think about the environments in which warm lighting is deliberately used today.

    A fireplace.

    A candlelit restaurant.

    A traditional pub.

    A living room in the evening.

    A bedside lamp.

    A hotel lounge.

    Restaurants and homes routinely use warm lighting precisely because people associate it with intimacy and relaxation.

    Now consider where colder, brighter white illumination is commonly encountered.

    Hospitals.

    Offices.

    Car parks.

    Warehouses.

    Supermarkets.

    Security installations.

    The distinction isn’t universal, but the associations are powerful.

    Warm light says: settle in.

    Cold, bright light often says: stay alert.

    When sodium streetlighting disappeared, therefore, cities didn’t merely exchange one lamp technology for another. In many places they changed the psychological language of the nighttime environment.

    Why LEDs Won Anyway

    There are very good reasons cities embraced LEDs.

    An LED luminaire can direct light toward the pavement and road far more precisely than many older lighting systems. That means less electricity can be wasted illuminating places where light isn’t required.

    LEDs are highly efficient, have long service lives and can be electronically controlled. Councils can dim them during periods of low traffic rather than operating every streetlight at full output throughout the night.

    Their white light also has an enormous practical advantage over sodium: colour rendering.

    Under sodium illumination, colour information is severely compromised. Under a good-quality white LED, a pedestrian’s clothing, a vehicle, road markings and surrounding objects can be distinguished much more accurately.

    That can also make LED illumination considerably more useful to colour CCTV cameras.

    In other words, the move to LEDs wasn’t irrational.

    The mistake is assuming that efficiency is the only quality worth designing for.

    LED Doesn’t Have to Mean Cold

    This is perhaps the most important part of the discussion.

    An LED is not inherently cold white.

    LED streetlights can be manufactured at many different correlated colour temperatures.

    A 4000K LED can appear relatively neutral or cool. A 3000K LED is noticeably warmer. At around 2700K the appearance begins approaching familiar warm domestic illumination, while approximately 2200K LEDs can produce an extremely warm amber character.

    Some British authorities already recognise this.

    Dorset Council’s streetlighting specification, for example, calls for warm-white LEDs no higher than 2700K in several environmental zones, ideally lower, while other UK lighting guidance recommends 3000K or below and specifically identifies the 2200–2700K range as an option where warmer, low-blue lighting is appropriate.

    Even the City of London’s lighting strategy recognises colour temperature as part of urban character. Its guidance describes using different colour temperatures according to the character and function of a place, including warmer illumination for historic streets and public spaces.

    That is a much more sophisticated approach than simply asking:

    Which lamp produces the required lux for the least electricity?

    The better question is:

    What should this place feel like at night?

    What We Lost Wasn’t Necessarily the Lamp

    There is another reason old sodium-lit London is difficult to reproduce.

    The characteristic atmosphere didn’t come entirely from the colour of the bulb.

    Older luminaires often scattered considerably more light into their surroundings. Sodium light hitting mist, drizzle, low cloud and airborne moisture produced the famous orange glow that once hung above many British towns and cities.

    Modern LED luminaires can control their beams much more tightly.

    From the perspective of light pollution, astronomy and energy efficiency, that is often an improvement.

    But aesthetically, something disappears.

    The old streetlight illuminated not merely the road but sometimes the air itself.

    On a wet London evening, that difference can be enormous.

    When Bad Colour Rendering Became Beautiful

    There is an irony here.

    One of the greatest technical disadvantages of sodium lighting may also have contributed to its charm.

    Its poor colour rendering unified everything.

    Brick, pavement, trees, parked cars and human faces were all pushed toward the same limited palette. The street became less colourful but perhaps more visually coherent.

    Modern LEDs restore information.

    You can see that the parked car is blue, the jacket is red and the front door is green.

    Technically, this is superior illumination.

    Aesthetically, however, accuracy isn’t always beauty.

    A black-and-white photograph contains less colour information than a modern digital photograph. That does not make the black-and-white photograph artistically inferior.

    Something similar can happen with lighting.

    The sodium lamp distorted reality.

    But it distorted it beautifully.

    The Broader Problem With the Modern City

    Streetlighting illustrates a much larger tension within modern society.

    We have become extraordinarily good at optimising things that can be measured.

    Energy consumption.

    Lumens.

    Maintenance intervals.

    Visibility.

    Operating costs.

    Component lifespan.

    Carbon emissions.

    All of these measurements matter.

    But human beings also experience qualities that are considerably harder to place in a spreadsheet:

    Comfort.

    Atmosphere.

    Beauty.

    Mystery.

    Familiarity.

    A sense of place.

    A feeling that somewhere belongs to people rather than merely functioning efficiently around them.

    Modernisation frequently produces genuine improvements while unintentionally removing these less measurable qualities.

    A railway station becomes cleaner and brighter but somehow less grand.

    A pub becomes safer and easier to maintain but loses its fireplace and dark wooden interior.

    A high street becomes more accessible and functional while acquiring the same paving, signage and furniture as every other high street.

    And a street becomes cheaper and more efficiently illuminated while losing the golden light that once made it unmistakably itself.

    Perhaps Progress Doesn’t Have to Look White

    The answer isn’t to reinstall inefficient old sodium lamps throughout London.

    Technology has moved on.

    The more interesting possibility is to use modern technology with a better understanding of human beings.

    LEDs give lighting designers extraordinary control. They can determine intensity, direction, timing and colour far more precisely than previous generations could.

    That should make it possible to create cities that are simultaneously efficient and atmospheric.

    Residential streets do not necessarily require the same lighting character as major traffic junctions.

    Historic districts do not necessarily need to look like railway platforms.

    Pedestrian areas could use warmer light than major roads.

    Lighting could become dimmer and warmer as the night progresses.

    And perhaps urban planners should begin treating darkness itself as something worth designing rather than simply something to eliminate.

    Some UK authorities are already moving toward warmer LEDs, demonstrating that the choice is not simply between old-fashioned sodium and harsh modern lighting.

    A City Is Something We Feel

    There is a tendency to discuss infrastructure as though humans experience cities through specification sheets.

    We don’t.

    We experience a city through rain reflecting from the pavement.

    Through the colour of brick at dusk.

    Through shadows beneath trees.

    Through the glow coming from a pub window.

    Through the walk home late at night.

    And through the colour of the streetlight above us.

    Perhaps that is why some people miss London’s old sodium lamps despite knowing perfectly well that LEDs are technologically superior.

    They aren’t necessarily nostalgic for inefficient light bulbs.

    They are nostalgic for an atmosphere.

    There may be something culturally learned in that feeling. There may even be something considerably older—an association between warm light, darkness, shelter and the extraordinarily long relationship between humans and fire.

    We should be cautious about claiming we can separate those influences neatly.

    But perhaps we don’t need to.

    The important lesson is simpler.

    Efficiency tells us how well a streetlight works. It does not tell us what it feels like to live beneath it.

    The best cities of the future should understand both.

  • Punishing the Picture, Missing the Problem: The Wasted Authority of Anti-Gun Culture in American Schools

    Punishing the Picture, Missing the Problem: The Wasted Authority of Anti-Gun Culture in American Schools

    When I was a child in an American school (Forsyth County, GA), I once drew a cartoon that included a gun. I was fascinated by guns at the time—not because I wanted to hurt anyone, but because, like plenty of children, I found certain machines, weapons, vehicles, and military imagery interesting. For that drawing, I received two days of in-school suspension.

    Looking back, what strikes me is not simply that the punishment was excessive. It is how little it had to do with preventing actual gun violence.

    American schools have an entirely legitimate responsibility to take threats seriously. A student who communicates an intention to shoot someone, brings a weapon to school, attempts to obtain a weapon for an attack, or exhibits other concrete behavior indicating preparation for violence presents a fundamentally different situation from a child who draws a fictional gun. Treating these things as equivalent does not necessarily make a school more vigilant. It can make the school less capable of distinguishing a genuine danger from ordinary childhood expression.

    That distinction matters because the United States has a real firearm-violence problem affecting young people. Firearm injuries became the leading cause of death among Americans ages 1–19 in 2020 and 2021 when homicide, suicide, and unintentional firearm deaths are considered together. The causes of that problem are complicated, but punishing children for images of guns is a remarkably indirect response to it.

    There is also reason to question the broader disciplinary philosophy behind such punishment. The American Psychological Association’s review of school zero-tolerance policies found little evidence supporting the assumptions behind those policies. The available evidence tended to contradict the idea that rigid, mandatory punishments make schools safer. The APA instead recommended graduated discipline, consideration of context, and reserving the most serious consequences for the most serious behavior.

    This does not mean that a disturbing drawing should always be ignored. Context matters enormously. A drawing accompanied by a specific threat against classmates is different from a cartoon battle. A student repeatedly expressing a desire to murder someone is different from a student sketching a soldier holding a rifle. The sensible question is therefore not simply, “Does this picture contain a gun?” It is, “What does this behavior tell us about this particular student, in this particular context?”

    That is much closer to the philosophy behind behavioral threat assessment. Rather than assuming that a particular image, interest, personality trait, or superficial characteristic identifies a future attacker, threat assessment examines behavior and circumstances: Has a threat actually been made? Is it credible? Has the student taken steps toward carrying it out? Is there an underlying conflict or crisis that needs intervention? What information do teachers, parents, counselors, and others have?

    Research and guidance developed in response to school shootings have specifically warned against simplistic profiling. School attacks are rare enough, and potential “warning signs” broad enough, that crude checklists can identify large numbers of harmless students while still failing to identify genuine danger. The U.S. Secret Service’s National Threat Assessment Center has instead advocated comprehensive programs focused on identifying and assessing concerning behavior and intervening before violence occurs.

    That approach also recognizes an uncomfortable truth: prevention requires considerably more work than punishment.

    Giving a child detention or suspension because there is a gun in his drawing is administratively easy. Understanding why a particular student has made a serious threat, investigating whether the student has access to firearms, communicating with parents, addressing bullying or interpersonal conflicts, providing appropriate mental-health or behavioral support, and evaluating whether a threat is progressing toward violence are much harder tasks.

    But those harder tasks are the ones more closely connected to the danger schools are supposedly trying to prevent.

    Research into school-associated violent deaths illustrates why. The CDC has reported that firearms used in school-associated homicides and suicides frequently came from the perpetrator’s home or from friends or relatives. It has also found that perpetrators sometimes communicated warning signals before attacks. Those facts point toward questions of firearm access, threatening behavior, communication, intervention, and adult awareness—not toward the mere existence of firearm imagery in a child’s notebook.

    There is another potential cost to treating harmless expression as dangerous behavior. Schools need students to report genuine concerns. An effective safety system depends upon students trusting adults enough to tell them when a classmate makes a credible threat or appears to be preparing for violence. A disciplinary culture that treats every reference to violence as an offense risks blurring the distinction between students who need punishment, students who need help, students who require investigation, and students who have done nothing dangerous at all.

    None of this requires schools to become indifferent to threatening material. Quite the opposite. Schools should take potentially threatening behavior seriously enough to investigate its meaning rather than mechanically reacting to its imagery.

    A picture can sometimes be evidence. It should not automatically be a verdict.

    The larger mistake is confusing visible symbols of America’s gun culture with the causes of America’s gun violence. A gun drawn on a sheet of paper is conspicuous and easy for an institution to prohibit. The conditions associated with actual violence—access to firearms, credible threats, escalating behavior, interpersonal crises, failures of communication, and missed opportunities for intervention—are considerably more difficult to address.

    School safety policy should therefore be judged by what it accomplishes, not by how uncompromising it appears.

    If punishing a child for drawing a cartoon gun cannot be shown to reduce the likelihood of violence, then the punishment should not be defended merely because it demonstrates that the institution “takes guns seriously.” Taking gun violence seriously means directing attention toward measures that can actually identify and reduce danger.

    America does not suffer from a shortage of condemnation of gun violence. It suffers from gun violence itself.

    The appropriate response is not to become less vigilant. It is to become more discriminating about what vigilance means: distinguishing expression from intent, fascination from preparation, and an image of violence from evidence that violence may actually occur.

    A school that can make those distinctions is not being soft on violence. It is concentrating its attention where it matters.

  • Can Piddlington Really Leave the UK?

    Can Piddlington Really Leave the UK?

    Can Piddington Really Leave the United Kingdom? The Law Behind the Village’s ‘Independence’ Referendum

    Residents of Piddington in Oxfordshire have voted overwhelmingly to “leave” the United Kingdom, but the legal consequences of the vote are considerably less dramatic than the headline suggests.

    In a referendum held on 15 September 2026, 312 votes were cast. Of those, 285 supported independence, 26 opposed it and one ballot was spoiled. Following the result, Piddington Parish Council chairman Tim McNally announced that the village would be known as the “Principality of Piddington”.

    The referendum was held against the backdrop of government proposals to accommodate up to 1,256 male asylum seekers at a former Ministry of Defence site near Bicester. Residents and local representatives have raised objections concerning matters including consultation, infrastructure and pedestrian access to the site. The Government, meanwhile, has said the use of former military sites forms part of its policy of reducing reliance on asylum hotels.

    But whatever its political significance, the referendum does not make Piddington an independent country.

    A parish council cannot secede from the United Kingdom

    The fundamental difficulty for the proposed “Principality” is straightforward: there is no mechanism in UK law allowing an English parish, village, town or city to unilaterally declare itself independent.

    The BBC’s explanation of the Piddington referendum similarly notes that there is no legal mechanism by which a village, town or city can declare independence from the UK, meaning Piddington’s vote is symbolic.

    Piddington Parish Council is not a sovereign legislature. It is part of the first tier of English local government.

    Modern parish councils derive their status principally from legislation including the Local Government Act 1972. Their powers concern local-government matters rather than questions of national sovereignty. The House of Commons Library describes parish and town councils as the “first tier of local government”.

    Piddington Parish Council itself lists powers covering such matters as community buildings, recreational facilities, allotments, rights of way, public conveniences, local transport initiatives and neighbourhood planning. None amounts to a power to alter the territory of the United Kingdom or remove the parish from UK jurisdiction.

    Consequently, the referendum does not remove Piddington from England, Oxfordshire or the United Kingdom.

    UK Acts of Parliament continue to apply there. Residents remain subject to the same national taxation and criminal and civil law as before. UK citizenship is unaffected, and the courts, police and public authorities retain their existing jurisdiction.

    Calling the village the “Principality of Piddington” does not alter that position.

    What about the referendum result?

    Referendums can have very different legal effects depending upon the legislation under which they are conducted.

    The UK permits local referendums on matters affecting local areas, but the existence of a referendum does not itself confer constitutional powers upon the authority organising it. Government material concerning the local-referendum regime has expressly distinguished such votes from binding decision-making, describing the policy objective as giving residents a means of influence rather than control.

    That distinction is particularly important in Piddington.

    A vote can demonstrate what participating residents want. It cannot give a parish council a power that Parliament has never conferred upon it.

    The 285 votes for independence therefore constitute a substantial democratic expression among those who voted, but they do not themselves alter Piddington’s constitutional status.

    In legal terms, Piddington was part of the United Kingdom before the referendum and remains part of the United Kingdom afterwards.

    Could Piddington ever become independent?

    This produces a more interesting constitutional question.

    Although Piddington cannot unilaterally leave the United Kingdom, it does not necessarily follow that its independence would be legally impossible under every imaginable circumstance.

    The reason is parliamentary sovereignty.

    The orthodox constitutional position is that the UK Parliament is the supreme legislative authority. Parliament describes parliamentary sovereignty as meaning that it can create or end any law, while the House of Commons Library describes Parliament as possessing the authority to “make or unmake any law”.

    Accordingly, Parliament could in principle enact primary legislation fundamentally changing Piddington’s constitutional status.

    Such an extraordinary measure would have to deal with numerous practical questions: the precise territorial boundary, nationality and citizenship, taxation, property, policing, courts, public services, highways, utilities, existing contractual obligations and the relationship between the new territory and the remainder of the UK.

    The important distinction is therefore between unilateral secession and independence authorised through UK constitutional law.

    Piddington has no legal power to accomplish the former. Parliament’s legislative sovereignty means that the latter is theoretically conceivable, although there is presently no indication that Parliament intends to enact such legislation.

    Could Piddington simply refuse to recognise UK law?

    No.

    A declaration of independence by the parish council would not deprive Parliament of legislative authority over the area. Nor would declaring Piddington a “principality” create a separate legal system.

    Residents could not, for example, stop paying UK taxes on the basis that they now lived in another country. Businesses would remain subject to applicable UK law, and criminal offences committed in Piddington would continue to fall within the ordinary criminal justice system.

    The same principle would apply to attempts to establish border controls, issue legally effective passports or disregard decisions of UK public authorities.

    Those activities require legal authority. A local declaration cannot manufacture that authority.

    Does international law change the position?

    References to the international-law principle of self-determination would not automatically transform Piddington into a sovereign state.

    Questions of self-determination and secession under international law are considerably more complicated than the proposition that any community which votes for independence thereby becomes independent.

    Most importantly for Piddington’s immediate situation, a local referendum cannot by itself disapply UK domestic law. Unless and until the UK’s constitutional arrangements were legally changed, British authorities and courts would continue to treat Piddington as UK territory.

    Recognition by other states would also be an entirely separate issue from the parish council declaring itself independent.

    What has actually changed?

    Legally, very little.

    Politically, the referendum gives campaigners a striking piece of evidence about the views expressed by participating residents and has generated national media attention for their objections to the proposed asylum accommodation site. The public consultation concerning the development was reported as running until 17 September.

    Constitutionally, however, the position remains much more mundane.

    The “Principality of Piddington” is a symbolic title rather than a new sovereign state. There is no new international border in Oxfordshire, no separate Piddington citizenship and no legal basis for the parish council to substitute its authority for that of Parliament.

    The referendum therefore matters primarily as an act of political expression rather than an exercise of constitutional power.

    Piddington has voted to leave the United Kingdom.

    Legally, it has not left at all.

    This article provides general legal and constitutional information and does not constitute legal advice.

  • Omar Benguit: The Great British Injustice

    Omar Benguit: The Great British Injustice

    Case Analysis

    The Evidential Weaknesses Surrounding the Conviction of Omar Benguit

    A review of the witness evidence, forensic gaps, retrials and continuing concerns surrounding the 2005 conviction.

    Important: Omar Benguit’s conviction remains legally valid. This article examines concerns about the strength and reliability of the evidence; it does not state that he has been judicially established to be innocent.

    Introduction

    Omar Benguit was convicted at Winchester Crown Court in January 2005 of murdering 26-year-old South Korean language student Jong-Ok Shin, known as Oki, in Bournemouth on 12 July 2002.

    Benguit has consistently denied responsibility. His case has attracted sustained concern because the conviction was obtained without forensic evidence linking him to the murder and depended heavily upon testimony from witnesses whose reliability has been challenged.

    Central question

    Was the testimonial and circumstantial evidence sufficiently reliable to establish guilt beyond reasonable doubt in the absence of an independent forensic link?

    Absence of forensic evidence

    Perhaps the most striking feature of the prosecution case was the absence of forensic evidence connecting Benguit to Shin or the murder scene.

    The murder weapon was never recovered, no eyewitness saw the attack itself, and the prosecution case was not supported by DNA, fingerprints or other scientific evidence directly placing Benguit with the victim.

    The absence of forensic evidence did not make a conviction impossible, but it made the credibility of the witnesses exceptionally important.

    Heavy dependence on a problematic principal witness

    The prosecution relied heavily on a principal witness who gave accounts placing Benguit in circumstances allegedly connected to the killing.

    However, her evidence contained serious credibility problems. She gave inconsistent statements, initially identified someone else, and admitted that parts of earlier accounts were untrue.

    “`

    Inconsistent accounts

    The witness gave differing versions of events and altered important details over time.

    False information

    Parts of her early statements were acknowledged to be false or misleading.

    Central importance

    Her evidence was not peripheral: it formed a major part of the prosecution case.

    “`

    Post-trial contradictions

    Concerns about the witness intensified after the trial when she later gave a public account that appeared materially different from her courtroom evidence.

    The Criminal Cases Review Commission later investigated new material relating to her credibility and referred Benguit’s conviction back to the Court of Appeal.

    2005 Benguit convicted after a third murder trial.
    2012 The CCRC referred the conviction back to the Court of Appeal.
    2014 The Court of Appeal upheld the conviction.
    2026 Further scrutiny of the case continues.

    Problems with supporting witnesses

    Other witnesses provided circumstantial evidence suggesting that Benguit appeared agitated, had blood on him or his clothing, wanted to change clothes, or had spoken about stabbing someone.

    These claims supported the prosecution case, but they remained witness testimony rather than physical proof of the murder.

    Why this matters:

    When a case depends heavily on multiple witnesses from a chaotic or unstable environment, the reliability, independence and consistency of those accounts become especially significant.

    Two juries previously failed to convict

    Benguit’s conviction came only after three murder trials. The first two juries were unable to reach a verdict on the murder charge.

    Two hung juries do not prove innocence. However, they demonstrate that earlier juries who heard versions of the prosecution evidence were unable to reach the level of certainty required for conviction.

    The knife evidence

    Witnesses gave evidence suggesting Benguit sometimes carried knives or had been seen sharpening one.

    Yet the murder weapon itself was never found, and no specific knife was scientifically connected to Shin’s death.

    Evidential distinction

    Evidence that a person possessed a knife is not the same as evidence that a particular knife was used by that person to commit a particular murder.

    The victim’s account

    Before her death, Shin was able to provide limited information about the attack. She reportedly described being attacked from behind by a masked man.

    That evidence was consistent with a sudden attack but did not identify Benguit.

    A possible alternative suspect

    The case has also attracted attention because convicted murderer Danilo Restivo was living in Bournemouth at the relevant time.

    The CCRC obtained evidence that it believed could have allowed the defence to raise an alternative-suspect argument. The Court of Appeal later considered and rejected that argument as insufficient to make the conviction unsafe.

    Important distinction: It would be inaccurate to state as fact that Restivo killed Shin. His involvement has been raised as an alternative-suspect theory, not established by a court.

    Why the conviction has survived

    A balanced assessment must also acknowledge that the courts have repeatedly rejected the argument that the conviction is unsafe.

    The prosecution case was cumulative. It relied on the principal witness alongside supporting testimony concerning Benguit’s movements, alleged bloodstaining, his behaviour, alleged admissions and evidence about knives.

    The Court of Appeal concluded that the jury had been entitled to assess the weaknesses in the witness evidence and nevertheless convict.

    Conclusion

    The controversy surrounding Omar Benguit’s conviction arises not from a single decisive piece of exculpatory evidence but from the cumulative fragility of the case.

    There was no forensic evidence linking him to the murder, no recovered murder weapon, no eyewitness to the stabbing, significant problems with the principal witness, and two previous juries failed to reach a guilty verdict.

    None of those points proves that Benguit did not murder Jong-Ok Shin. But together they explain why the conviction has continued to attract scrutiny.

    The key issue remains simple:

    Was a heavily witness-dependent and circumstantial case, without an independent forensic link to the victim or crime scene, sufficiently reliable to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt?

  • Schizophrenia in Prison

    Schizophrenia in Prison

    Mental Health & Criminal Justice

    Schizophrenia in Prison: How Prevalence Compares with the General Population — and Why Women Are Especially Affected

    Severe mental illness is substantially over-represented in prisons. The disparity is particularly pronounced among women, who make up only a small proportion of the prison population but experience exceptionally high levels of mental ill-health, trauma and self-harm.

    Important note on terminology: schizophrenia and psychosis are not interchangeable terms. Schizophrenia is one cause of psychosis, while psychotic symptoms can also occur in bipolar disorder, severe depression, substance-related conditions and other illnesses. Modern prison research frequently reports psychotic disorder rather than schizophrenia alone. This report therefore distinguishes between the two wherever the evidence allows.

    The headline finding

    The gap between prisons and the wider population is substantial. In the major Office for National Statistics study of psychiatric morbidity among prisoners in England and Wales, approximately 14% of women in prison had experienced a functional psychosis during the previous year. Within the clinically interviewed group, approximately 13% were identified as having schizophrenia or a delusional disorder.

    By comparison, psychotic disorders affect well below 1% of adults living in ordinary households. The latest Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey for England estimates past-year psychotic disorder at approximately 0.5% of adults overall, including approximately 0.6% of women.

    14%
    Women in prison
    Functional psychosis in the previous year in the landmark England & Wales prison survey
    “`
    0.6%
    Women in the community
    Estimated past-year psychotic disorder in recent English household surveys
    13%
    Schizophrenia / delusional disorder
    Women prisoners identified in the clinical component of the ONS study
    “`

    Caution: the 14% prison figure and contemporary 0.6% community figure come from different surveys conducted in different periods. They illustrate the scale of the disparity but should not be treated as a precise like-for-like calculation of risk.

    How do prisoners compare with people outside prison?

    Population / measure Reported prevalence What the figure means
    Women in prison 14% Functional psychosis during the previous year in the landmark ONS England & Wales prison survey.
    Men on remand 10% Functional psychosis during the previous year.
    Sentenced men 7% Functional psychosis during the previous year.
    Women in the general population 0.6% Recent pooled estimate of past-year psychotic disorder among women living in private households in England.
    Adults overall in the general population 0.5% Recent pooled estimate of past-year psychotic disorder among adults in England.

    Although differences in study design prevent a simple mathematical comparison, the conclusion is difficult to miss: psychotic illness is many times more common among people in prison than among people living in the community, and historically the highest prison rates have been found among women.

    Women in prison: a particularly vulnerable population

    Women make up only a small minority of people held in prisons in England and Wales, but their mental-health needs are disproportionately high. Contemporary prison data continue to show this pattern. Recent Prison Reform Trust figures report that almost three-quarters of surveyed women in prison say that they have mental-health problems.

    Research comparing male and female prisoners has also repeatedly found higher levels of mental-health need and greater psychiatric comorbidity among women. A 2019 UK prison study, for example, found that women reported significantly higher levels of mental-health need than men and were more likely to screen positively for multiple disorders.

    Why the female prison population requires particular attention

    The issue is not simply the number of women diagnosed with a particular psychiatric condition. Women entering custody frequently have overlapping needs involving severe mental illness, depression and anxiety, substance dependence, histories of trauma and abuse, self-harm, unstable housing and disrupted family relationships. These conditions can interact, making both diagnosis and treatment more complex.

    Schizophrenia specifically

    Schizophrenia is a severe, long-term mental-health condition that can affect a person’s thoughts, perceptions, emotions and behaviour. Symptoms may include hallucinations, delusions, disorganised thinking, reduced motivation and difficulties with everyday functioning.

    The most frequently cited schizophrenia-specific evidence for female prisoners in England and Wales comes from the ONS psychiatric morbidity research. In its clinical assessment of women prisoners, approximately 13% were identified as having a schizophrenic or delusional disorder. Approximately 3% were classified specifically with schizophrenia, while the wider 13% category included other delusional disorders.

    This distinction matters. Statements such as “14% of women prisoners have schizophrenia” are not supported by this dataset. The 14% figure relates to functional psychosis as a whole, not schizophrenia alone.

    Is this still a problem today?

    The most detailed national diagnostic study of schizophrenia among women prisoners is now old, which is itself an important limitation in the evidence base. However, newer information does not suggest that serious mental illness has ceased to be a major prison-health issue.

    A recent analysis of mental-health caseloads covering around three-quarters of English prisons found that psychosis accounted for approximately 22% of the primary problems among patients on prison mental-health caseloads. This figure must not be interpreted as saying that 22% of all prisoners have psychosis: it describes people already receiving or identified for mental-health services. Nevertheless, it demonstrates the continuing demand that psychotic illness places on prison mental-health teams.

    Recent surveys have also found that approximately 74% of women in prison report having mental-health problems, compared with 56% of men surveyed. Women consequently remain a group with particularly complex health and social-care needs.

    Why is severe mental illness over-represented in prisons?

    There is no single explanation. Prison populations are not randomly selected sections of society. Many of the social and health factors associated with contact with the criminal-justice system also overlap with factors associated with poor mental health.

    • Social disadvantage: poverty, insecure housing and homelessness are disproportionately represented among people entering custody.
    • Trauma and abuse: histories of violence, neglect, domestic abuse and sexual abuse are common among women who enter the criminal-justice system.
    • Substance use: drug and alcohol dependence can coexist with schizophrenia and other psychotic disorders, complicating both symptoms and treatment.
    • Breakdown of community support: people with severe mental illness may reach the criminal-justice system after difficulties obtaining stable housing, treatment or social support.
    • Remand and crisis: prisons can receive people who are acutely mentally unwell while they are awaiting trial or assessment.
    • The prison environment itself: isolation, uncertainty, disrupted relationships, sleep difficulties and the stresses of incarceration may aggravate existing psychiatric symptoms.

    Trauma, self-harm and women

    Looking only at schizophrenia risks overlooking the broader context in which severe mental illness occurs. Women in prison are also disproportionately affected by trauma and self-harm.

    Recent prison statistics show that women account for a strikingly disproportionate share of self-harm incidents despite representing only around 4% of the prison population in England and Wales. This does not mean schizophrenia causes self-harm, but it illustrates the exceptionally high level of distress and complex need within the female estate.

    For women with psychosis or schizophrenia, these overlapping vulnerabilities can make continuity of care particularly important. A prison sentence or period on remand can interrupt housing, family support, benefits, community psychiatric care and established therapeutic relationships.

    Prison or healthcare?

    The high prevalence of severe mental illness in custody raises a fundamental question: are some people with serious psychiatric disorders being dealt with primarily through the criminal-justice system when healthcare and community-based intervention would sometimes be more appropriate?

    This is particularly relevant to women because many are imprisoned for relatively low-level or non-violent offending and because a significant proportion of the female prison population is held on remand. Prison Reform Trust research has highlighted cases in which severely mentally unwell women have entered custody while in crisis, including concerns about the historical use of prison as a place of safety.

    Effective responses therefore extend beyond providing medication after somebody arrives in prison. They include early identification, court diversion and liaison services, timely psychiatric assessment, access to psychological treatment, transfer to appropriate hospital care where necessary, safe accommodation and continuity of treatment after release.

    What should we conclude?

    The central finding is clear: severe mental illness and psychotic disorders are substantially over-represented in prisons compared with the community, and women in prison show an especially high burden of mental-health need.

    The classic national research found functional psychosis in around 14% of women prisoners and schizophrenia or delusional disorder in around 13% of the clinically assessed female sample. Contemporary population research, by contrast, places past-year psychotic disorder below 1% among women living in private households.

    The precise figures should be interpreted cautiously because diagnostic definitions and research methods have changed over time. What has not disappeared is the underlying disparity. More recent studies and prison-health data continue to find exceptionally high levels of mental illness among people in custody and greater levels of need among women.

    For policy, this suggests that schizophrenia and psychosis in prisons cannot be treated solely as issues of prison management. They are also questions of public health, social inequality, trauma, access to psychiatric services, diversion from custody and continuity of care.

    A note on UK figures

    Criminal justice and health systems differ across England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. The most robust national prison figures cited in this article relate primarily to England and Wales, while some later research is described as UK prison research. It is therefore more accurate to describe these figures by jurisdiction rather than assuming a single prevalence rate applies uniformly to every prison in the United Kingdom.

    Sources and further reading

    1. Office for National Statistics / O’Brien et al. — Psychiatric Morbidity among Women Prisoners in England and Wales. Landmark national research measuring psychosis, schizophrenia, personality disorder and other psychiatric morbidity among women prisoners.
    2. NHS England Digital. — Adult Psychiatric Morbidity Survey: Survey of Mental Health and Wellbeing, England, 2023/24 — Chapter 12: Psychotic Disorder.
    3. Tyler, N., Miles, H. L., Karadag, B. & Rogers, G. (2019). — An updated picture of the mental health needs of male and female prisoners in the UK: prevalence, comorbidity, and gender differences. Social Psychiatry and Psychiatric Epidemiology, 54, 1143–1152. DOI: 10.1007/s00127-019-01690-1.
    4. Prison Reform Trust. — Health in Prison. Current overview of mental-health needs within prisons in England and Wales.
    5. Durcan, G. / Centre for Mental Health (2023). — Prison mental health services in England, 2023: Prison and young offender institution mental health needs analysis.
    6. Prison Reform Trust (2025–2026). — Publications concerning women in prison, remand, mental health, self-harm and approaches to reducing women’s imprisonment.
    Editorial note: This article discusses population-level research and should not be used to infer that criminal behaviour is characteristic of people with schizophrenia. The great majority of people experiencing mental illness are not prisoners, and diagnosis alone does not determine an individual’s risk or behaviour.
  • The Human Radius of Murder: From Atlanta to London and Lithuania

    The Human Radius of Murder: From Atlanta to London and Lithuania

    Longform Documentary Essay

    The Human Radius of Murder

    How two murders in Atlanta rippled across families, countries, and twenty years of memory.


    I n August 2004, my family moved from the United Kingdom to Atlanta, Georgia. A few months later, my father found work for an old childhood friend from Lithuania: Rolandas Milinavičius.

    At the time, there was no reason for me to believe that name would stay with me for the next twenty years.

    Milinavičius owned a business exporting American cars to the Middle East. My father worked loading vehicles into shipping containers—often alone, often in the suffocating Georgia heat. Their friendship slowly became a business relationship, and their business relationship slowly became something much darker.

    Five Cars Instead of Three

    My father approached container loading differently. Trained as a carpenter in Britain, he built timber frameworks that secured vehicles tightly enough to fit five cars where others managed only three.

    The journey to Jordan or Saudi Arabia was nearly 7,000 miles. Most containers arrived with dented panels and shattered bumpers. His arrived without a scratch.

    “Who packed these containers? Give this man a call.”

    Eventually, my father left Milinavičius and built his own warehouse. It was an enormous gamble—$50,000 a month in rent before paying a single employee—but it worked. Some months the business earned more than Milinavičius had ever imagined.

    ● ● ●

    Inga and Martynas

    Two people remained working for Rolandas.

    Inga Bandzevičiūtė-Contreras. Martynas Simokaitis.

    Before they became victims in a murder case, they were simply young Lithuanian immigrants trying to build lives in America.

    According to my father, he offered both of them jobs at his new company. They wanted to leave, but they couldn’t. Their employer owed them months of wages, and walking away meant abandoning money they had already earned.

    They weren’t trapped by loyalty.

    They were trapped by debt.

    Years later, I discovered that contemporary Lithuanian reporting described the same financial desperation: unpaid wages, borrowed money, and two young people trying desperately to earn enough to visit their families back home. (Public reporting supports the financial conflict, while my father’s offer of employment comes from our family’s recollection.)

    Martynas and Inga
    Martynas Simokaitis and Inga Bandzevičiūtė-Contreras were preparing to return to Lithuania in the summer of 2007.

    They Were Going Home

    This is the detail I find hardest to forget.

    Both of them were planning to go home.

    Martynas hadn’t seen Lithuania in seven years. The relatives who had raised him were waiting for him in Kybartai. Inga’s mother was waiting in Kaunas. Both had tickets in their future.

    They were waiting at the airport.

    Instead, they received ashes.
    ● ● ●

    July 26, 2007

    On a Thursday morning in East Point, Georgia, Inga and Martynas went to work at RM Auto International. They never came home.

    Surveillance cameras recorded three people entering the building: Rolandas Milinavičius, Inga, and Martynas. Only one person was recorded leaving.

    Two days later, Milinavičius surrendered to police. In 2008, a Fulton County jury convicted him of two counts of malice murder and he received two consecutive life sentences.

    The Question That Stayed With Me

    “How long does a murder last?”

    The Radius

    Most true crime stories end with the verdict.

    Two victims. One murderer. A sentence. Fade to black.

    But murder doesn’t end when the courtroom empties. It continues in birthdays where someone is missing. In parents who instinctively reach for the phone. In children who grow up carrying a surname they never chose.

    It reaches old friends, business partners, investigators, journalists—and sometimes children standing quietly near the edge of the story, who grow into adults still thinking about the people at its centre.

    A murder happens in a room.

    Its consequences do not stay there.

    They cross oceans. They enter homes the killer has never seen. They survive prison sentences and court appeals. They become memories carried by people who were never listed as victims in a legal document.


    Perhaps the question isn’t why Rolandas Milinavičius killed Inga Bandzevičiūtė-Contreras and Martynas Simokaitis.

    Perhaps the question is simply this:

    How long does a murder last?

    As long as somebody remembers.

  • How The Fist Bump Became Less Informal Via COVID

    The Fist Bump Became Respectable
    Culture · Behaviour · Public Health

    The Fist Bump Became Respectable

    How a gesture associated with sport, friendship and informality acquired a new role during COVID-19: a legitimate greeting for offices, public figures and strangers who still wanted to acknowledge one another without reaching for the handshake.

    The central claim

    COVID did not invent the fist bump. It changed what the gesture was allowed to mean.

    There was a moment in early 2020 when one of the oldest pieces of social choreography in the Western world suddenly stopped working. A hand came forward and the other person hesitated. Someone laughed, withdrew, waved, touched an elbow, offered a foot, or produced the compact closed fist that had spent decades living in a very different social register.

    The fist bump was not new. Long before COVID-19 it belonged comfortably to sport, friendship, youth culture and celebratory ritual. It could communicate solidarity without the ceremony of a handshake. Precisely because it was relaxed, it was useful. Precisely because it was relaxed, however, it could look out of place in the office, the clinic, the conference room or the first encounter between two professionals.

    Then the pandemic disrupted the hierarchy of greetings.

    A gesture can become more formal without changing its shape. What changes is the situation in which society permits it. Formality is contextual, not anatomical.

    The most interesting story is therefore not that people began bumping fists. It is that the fist bump became socially intelligible in situations where, only a short time earlier, it might have seemed unserious. COVID supplied a justification powerful enough to override etiquette: infection control. Once that happened, an informal gesture acquired institutional permission.

    1. Before COVID, the fist bump had a status problem

    Research published before the pandemic already suggested that fist bumps could reduce some forms of microbial transfer compared with handshakes. A 2013 pilot study in a hospital setting argued that the smaller contact area and shorter contact time of a fist bump could make it a useful alternative. A 2014 experimental study likewise found substantially less bacterial transfer during fist bumps and high-fives than during handshakes.

    But hygiene was only half the question. Greetings are cultural objects. They communicate age, distance, rank, warmth, professionalism and belonging. An epidemiologically attractive greeting can still fail if people think it looks ridiculous.

    A later infection-prevention paper discussing the fist-bump proposal captured the resistance vividly. In a survey of infection-control practitioners, respondents worried that fist bumps were culturally incongruent, “too American,” associated with youth or street culture, potentially aggressive, and—most importantly for this argument—unprofessional. The problem was not whether two knuckles could touch. It was what those knuckles seemed to say.

    The old social coding

    The handshake carried institutional weight. It opened interviews, concluded deals, welcomed clients and marked introductions. It was conventional enough to disappear into the background. The fist bump did the opposite: it announced style. Using one could imply friendliness, informality, camaraderie or self-conscious coolness. That made it expressive, but it also limited where it could safely be used.

    2. Then the handshake became a problem

    In March 2020, the meaning of refusing a handshake changed almost overnight. What could previously have read as coldness or disrespect could now read as responsibility. Newspapers documented officials, clinicians and ordinary people improvising alternatives: waves, bows, elbow bumps, foot taps and other deliberately contact-reduced greetings.

    This reversal matters. Etiquette normally rewards predictability. COVID made the predictable action—taking somebody’s outstretched hand—the questionable one. Suddenly every encounter contained a tiny negotiation. Do we touch? Do we not? Which replacement gesture do we both understand?

    Researchers studying real-world greetings during the pandemic described exactly this process: routine tactile greetings became hesitant, suspended, refused or replaced, while newer practices such as elbow and foot bumps gradually became normalised. Social customs did not vanish. They adapted.

    The pandemic did not abolish greeting rituals. It exposed them as technology: small social tools that can be redesigned when conditions change. A crisis made etiquette visible.

    The fist bump had a major advantage in this chaotic market of alternatives. Unlike a foot tap, it did not require balance. Unlike an elbow bump, it did not require two people to angle their bodies awkwardly. Unlike a wave, it retained a moment of reciprocal touch. It was already widely understood. COVID did not need to invent a new gesture; it needed to reclassify an existing one.

    3. The professionalisation of an informal gesture

    Calling the result “formal” needs precision. No etiquette authority issued a decree announcing that the fist bump now belonged beside the handshake. The transformation was softer and more interesting: its range expanded.

    A greeting that once risked appearing too casual became acceptable between people who were not intimate friends. It could appear at work, at public events, in medical contexts and between people meeting for the first time. The health rationale supplied legitimacy, and repeated use supplied familiarity. Once a gesture can be performed between relative strangers without requiring an explanation, it has crossed an important social boundary.

    This is how customs often change. First comes exception: “We are doing this because circumstances are unusual.” Then repetition. Then shared understanding. Eventually the explanatory sentence disappears.

    The fist bump also solved an emotional problem. A pandemic greeting needed to communicate caution without communicating rejection. A person could decline the open palm yet still offer something. The bump therefore said two things at once: I am maintaining a boundary, and I am still acknowledging you.

    4. What COVID left behind

    The handshake survived. So did hugs, cheek kisses and the countless other rituals people suspended or modified. The pandemic did not produce a permanent one-gesture replacement, and research on infection transmission remains more nuanced than the simple claim that a fist bump is always “safe.” A 2020 study involving MRSA, for example, did not find a significant reduction with a traditional fist bump compared with a handshake, although a modified low-contact bump did reduce transfer.

    But the cultural change does not require the fist bump to have medically defeated the handshake. Its importance is sociological. The pandemic widened the set of gestures that could perform seriousness and respect.

    Before 2020, a fist bump in a formal encounter could be interpreted as deliberately casual. After 2020, the same gesture could be interpreted as considerate, hygienic, efficient or simply normal. It retained its friendly character while losing some of its social risk.

    That is the lasting transformation. COVID did not turn the fist bump into a bow or a business handshake. It did something subtler: it gave an informal greeting a professional passport.


    The gesture stayed the same. Its jurisdiction changed.

    Sources & further reading

    1. Ghareeb, P. A. et al. (2013), “Reducing pathogen transmission in a hospital setting. Handshake versus fist bump: a pilot study,” Journal of Hospital Infection.
    2. Mela, S. & Whitworth, D. E. (2014), “The fist bump: a more hygienic alternative to the handshake,” American Journal of Infection Control.
    3. Macdonald, A. S. et al. (2016), “Are you serious? From fist bumping to hand hygiene: Considering culture, context and complexity in infection prevention intervention research.”
    4. Mondada, L. et al. (2020), “Human sociality in the times of the Covid-19 pandemic: A systematic examination of change in greetings.”
    5. Pinto-Herrera, N. C. et al. (2020), “Transfer of methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus by fist bump versus handshake,” Infection Control & Hospital Epidemiology.
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  • Beyond Emergency Release: What England and Wales Can Learn from Norway, Japan and Oklahoma

    Beyond Emergency Release: What England and Wales Can Learn from Norway, Japan and Oklahoma

    Policy report · Prisons & public safety

    Beyond Emergency Release: What England and Wales Can Learn from Norway, Japan and Oklahoma

    A comparative report on prison capacity, sentencing and public safety

    Prepared for publication · Evidence checked September 2026

    Executive summary

    England and Wales have repeatedly come within a few thousand places of a full prison system. Ministers have responded with accelerated release, police-cell contingencies and an urgent building programme. These measures may prevent an immediate breakdown, but they do not solve the structural problem: the number and length of custodial sentences have grown faster than the system’s safe, staffed capacity.

    Norway and Japan show that a rich democracy does not have to operate its prisons at the edge of collapse. They do not, however, offer a single model. Norway confines far fewer people and deliberately moves suitable sentences into the community, including extensive use of electronic monitoring. Its correctional philosophy treats release and reintegration as the normal destination of a sentence. Japan’s prison population has fallen sharply for different reasons, including a long decline in recorded crime and prison admissions, demographic change and the retention of an estate built for a much larger population. Japan’s prisons are orderly but often highly restrictive; low occupancy should not be mistaken for proof that every feature of the Japanese regime is humane or transferable.

    Oklahoma provides a different lesson. The state became an international symbol of very high incarceration, driven in part by punitive sentencing and drug policy, before voters and legislators pursued reforms. Its experience illustrates the danger of allowing imprisonment to become the default response and then relying on clemency, emergency powers or hurried releases once capacity and cost become politically intolerable. It is a warning about governing by pressure gauge.

    As of 27 July 2026, England and Wales held 86,267 people in prison, or about 136 per 100,000 residents. Norway held 3,019, or 54 per 100,000, at the end of July 2026. Japan held 41,232, or 33 per 100,000, in mid-2025. These figures are not simple league tables: laws, recording practices, crime patterns and demographic structures differ. But the scale of the gap is too large to dismiss. England and Wales use imprisonment much more heavily than either comparator. (World Prison Brief: England and Wales, Norway, Japan)

    Reform should not mean indiscriminate release. Serious and dangerous offenders must be confined where custody is necessary for public protection and punishment. Reform means reserving expensive prison places for those cases, reducing the use of short and ineffective custody, strengthening community sentences, making progression and release predictable, and investing in probation, treatment, housing and employment. It also means publishing a binding annual prison-demand plan so that sentencing legislation cannot quietly create more prisoners than the state can safely hold.

    This report recommends that the Government:

    1. establish a statutory prison-demand and capacity duty, with independent forecasts and a requirement that new sentencing laws identify their prison and probation consequences;
    2. create a presumption against short custodial sentences, with tightly defined judicial exceptions;
    3. expand credible, properly funded community sentences, treatment and electronic monitoring;
    4. introduce earned progression for eligible determinate sentences, with exclusions and risk controls for serious violence, sexual offending and terrorism;
    5. repair probation before transferring large volumes of work from prison;
    6. reduce unnecessary remand and recall, while improving court speed and licence decision-making;
    7. make rehabilitation operational—through purposeful activity, family contact, health care, housing and employment—not merely rhetorical;
    8. retain sufficient headroom so emergency release is exceptional rather than a recurring management tool; and
    9. evaluate reforms by reconviction, harm, compliance, victim confidence and total cost, not by prison numbers alone.

    1. The question Britain should be asking

    Public debate often begins too late. When prisons are nearly full, the apparent choice is between building cells and releasing prisoners early. Both options become politically charged: construction is presented as proof of toughness; release as proof of recklessness. Yet by the time this argument begins, the most consequential decisions have already been made—in criminal law, charging, remand, sentence lengths, release rules, recall practice and the funding of probation.

    England and Wales do not have one homogeneous “UK prison system”. Criminal justice is devolved. Scotland and Northern Ireland operate separate systems, so the immediate capacity crisis and the statistics in this report concern England and Wales unless stated otherwise.

    The prison population here stood at 86,267 on 27 July 2026. On a comparable whole-population measure that was roughly 136 people per 100,000, compared with 54 in Norway and 33 in Japan. The remand population in England and Wales was 15,386—17.9% of all prisoners. (World Prison Brief)

    The Ministry of Justice’s last five-year projection placed the March 2029 population between 95,700 and 105,200, with a central estimate of 100,800. Projections are conditional, not destiny, but they reveal the direction produced by current policy assumptions. (Ministry of Justice prison population projections)

    The House of Commons Library also records a change in the composition of the prison population: by June 2025, 48% of determinate-sentence prisoners were serving terms longer than four years, up from 36% in 2010. In September 2025, 56% of prisons were classified as crowded. (House of Commons Library) The pressure is therefore not explained simply by a sudden wave of short sentences. Longer terms, remand, recall and system delay all matter.

    This is why “crime went up” is an inadequate diagnosis. Prison population is a stock. It rises when inflows grow, outflows slow, or both. Even if the number sentenced to custody were stable, longer average time served would increase the population. Conversely, crime can fall without promptly emptying prisons when long sentences already imposed continue to run.

    2. Four systems, four different stories

    Jurisdiction Latest reported prison population Rate per 100,000 What the comparison mainly shows
    England and Wales 86,267 (27 July 2026) 136 High use of custody relative to northern European and East Asian comparators; acute shortage of usable headroom
    Norway 3,019 (31 July 2026) 54 Lower imprisonment plus structured use of community execution and reintegration
    Japan 41,232 (mid-2025) 33 Long-term population decline and spare estate capacity; not a direct endorsement of prison conditions
    Oklahoma Not directly comparable with national totals Historically among the highest-incarcerating US states Consequences of sentence and drug-policy expansion, and the value of front-end reform

    Sources and caveat: National figures are from the World Prison Brief, which compiles mainly official data. Oklahoma includes state prisons and a complex local-jail/federal landscape, so it should not be ranked mechanically against national prison systems. Dates and definitions vary. The comparison is diagnostic, not a claim that one number captures public safety or justice.

    England and Wales: a demand-management failure

    The Independent Prison Capacity Review, led by Dame Anne Owers, concluded that the crisis arose from failures to align demand and supply and called for systems that trigger preventive action, including sufficient probation and community-service capacity. (Independent Prison Capacity Review) That finding matters because it reframes overcrowding. It was not an unforeseeable natural disaster. Successive policy choices accumulated without a reliable mechanism to reconcile their consequences.

    Emergency release can be necessary when the alternative is refusing lawful admissions or holding people in police cells. But repeated emergency release has serious costs. Victims receive short notice. Probation teams inherit cases before plans are ready. Local authorities and charities scramble for accommodation. Prisoners may leave without treatment, documents, work or stable support. The result can be both less humane and less safe than a planned shorter sentence with properly funded supervision.

    Conditions inside crowded establishments also weaken the very functions invoked to justify imprisonment. The 2025–26 annual report of HM Chief Inspector of Prisons drew on 84 inspections and related visits. Its continuing scrutiny of safety, respect, purposeful activity and rehabilitation demonstrates that nominal capacity is not enough: a place requires staff, health care, education, workshops and functioning infrastructure. (HM Chief Inspector of Prisons annual report 2025–26) A cell added to a spreadsheet is not necessarily a usable, decent or rehabilitative place.

    Norway: less custody and a different use of custody

    Norway is often reduced to photographs of attractive cells. That misses the structural lesson. The system uses fewer prison places because it limits their use and executes many eligible sentences under supervision outside an institution.

    Statistics Norway recorded 3,359 people in the prison population on 1 January 2024. During that year, there were 2,977 new institutional prison sentences and 2,967 new prison sentences served through electronic monitoring—almost equal numbers. Electronic monitoring may be used for eligible unconditional sentences of up to six months or for the final six months before expected release, with offence-based exclusions. (Statistics Norway)

    That is not “letting everyone off”. It is punishment with restrictions, surveillance and enforceable conditions, delivered without the automatic disruption of housing, employment and family ties that short imprisonment causes. Norway still uses closed prisons and preventive detention for people assessed as dangerous. Its useful principle is proportionality: the restriction should not exceed what punishment and safety require.

    Norway’s low reconviction figures are frequently advertised as a single “20% recidivism rate”. Comparisons of recidivism are treacherous because countries use different follow-up periods, populations and outcomes—rearrest, reconviction or return to prison. A systematic international review found a two-year reconviction rate of 17.6% for released prisoners in Norway, but the number should not be compared casually with a differently defined English statistic. (Yukhnenko et al., 2023) The defensible lesson is not that Norwegian prisons magically produce an exact percentage. It is that normalisation, continuity of services and planned resettlement are plausible parts of a lower-custody, lower-reconviction system.

    Japan: low occupancy, but not “Norway in Asia”

    Japan held 41,232 prisoners in mid-2025, a rate of 33 per 100,000. Its prison population peaked at more than 81,000 in the mid-2000s and has since nearly halved. The present estate therefore contains substantial capacity designed for a larger population. (World Prison Brief: Japan)

    This decline reflects a wider long-term reduction in recorded offending and in people entering prison, combined with demographic change. It cannot be attributed simply to comfortable prisons or expansive community supervision. Japanese prisons have traditionally imposed strict discipline, repetitive work and detailed behavioural rules. A reform argument should not romanticise those conditions.

    Japan also faces a distinctive challenge: an ageing prison population. Older people form a growing share of admissions even as admissions among younger groups have fallen. Poverty, isolation and repeated petty theft feature in research on older prisoners. This exposes an important limit to prison policy: unused cells do not resolve the welfare failures that bring vulnerable people into custody. The lesson for Britain is to divert health and social-care needs before they become expensive penal cases, not to copy institutional rigidity.

    Oklahoma: the cost of reacting after expansion

    Oklahoma is relevant precisely because it is not Norway or Japan. It sits within a US system that divides people among state prisons, county jails and federal custody, uses different sentence structures, and has historically incarcerated at exceptionally high rates. Direct numerical comparison with England and Wales would create false precision.

    Its policy history nevertheless makes three points. First, prison growth is strongly shaped by law: felony classifications, mandatory terms, drug sentencing, parole eligibility and revocation rules. Second, high incarceration carries fiscal and human costs without guaranteeing proportionate gains in safety. Third, once prisons and jails fill, government tends to reach for back-end relief—credits, commutations, emergency release or contracts for beds—that is less coherent than changing unnecessary admissions at the front end.

    Oklahoma voters’ approval of State Question 780 in 2016, which reclassified specified low-level drug-possession and property offences, showed how a jurisdiction can reduce pressure by changing who receives a felony and prison exposure. The broader warning is applicable to England and Wales: sentencing expansion is easy to announce one offence at a time, while its cumulative prison impact remains hidden until the system reaches crisis.

    3. What comparison can—and cannot—prove

    Comparative penal policy is full of tempting but weak claims. A lower imprisonment rate does not by itself prove that a country is safer, fairer or better at rehabilitation. Recorded crime depends on reporting and classification. Conviction depends on policing and prosecution. Prison population depends on legal thresholds and sentence length. Occupancy depends on how capacity is defined. Reoffending figures depend on the measure and follow-up window.

    Norway is smaller, wealthier per head and supported by a broad welfare state. Japan has lower levels of several forms of recorded violent crime, a shrinking population and distinctive social institutions. Oklahoma is a subnational US jurisdiction. England and Wales cannot import any system wholesale.

    But comparison remains valuable when it reveals mechanisms rather than rankings. Norway demonstrates that electronic monitoring and community execution can carry a substantial share of short custodial punishment. Japan demonstrates that prison populations can fall dramatically and leave spare capacity. Oklahoma demonstrates that high incarceration is a political product that can be altered by law. Together they refute the idea that chronic near-full occupancy is an unavoidable feature of a modern democracy.

    4. Why emergency release is the wrong permanent policy

    The objection to emergency release is not that every recipient remains dangerous. Many prisoners would be released soon in any event. The objection is that the date is moved because the estate is full rather than because a transparent sentencing framework, risk assessment and resettlement plan say it should be.

    This undermines legitimacy in four directions:

    • victims can reasonably feel that the sentence announced in court did not mean what it appeared to mean;
    • prison staff lose time needed for orderly progression and release planning;
    • probation services receive sudden and unstable workloads; and
    • the public is invited to confuse a logistical emergency with a considered reform.

    Planned reform is safer than improvised release. Parliament should determine in advance what proportion of eligible sentences is custodial, what proportion can be earned through good progress, what exclusions apply, and what supervision follows. The prison service should then operate with headroom, not wait until only a few hundred places remain.

    5. A reform programme for England and Wales

    5.1 Put prison demand under statutory control

    An independent body should publish an annual ten-year forecast covering prisons, probation, courts and community treatment. Every Bill and major sentencing guideline should include independently validated estimates of its effect on:

    • prison receptions and average time served;
    • remand and recall populations;
    • probation caseload and required staffing;
    • capital and operating costs; and
    • distributional effects, including women, young adults and minority groups.

    If policy creates demand above safe capacity, ministers should be required to identify funding or an offsetting reduction. This would make the hidden cumulative effect of “tougher” individual measures visible before enactment.

    5.2 Presume against short custody

    Short prison sentences often remove a person from work, housing, treatment and family while providing too little time for meaningful intervention. Courts should retain custody where immediate confinement is necessary, but legislation should create a presumption that sentences below a defined threshold are suspended or served in the community.

    Exceptions should be explicit and reviewable—for persistent breach, significant risk, domestic abuse cases requiring protection, or other circumstances in which a community order cannot safely manage the case. A presumption is preferable to an absolute ban because it preserves judicial judgment while changing the default.

    5.3 Make community punishment credible

    A community sentence that begins months late or offers no treatment will not command judicial confidence. Reform therefore requires capacity before diversion. Courts need rapid access to pre-sentence information and a real menu of sanctions: unpaid work, curfews, exclusion zones, alcohol monitoring, drug and mental-health treatment, restorative processes where appropriate, and intensive supervision.

    Norway’s scale of electronic monitoring is instructive, but technology is not rehabilitation. A tag can enforce time and place; it cannot secure a tenancy, treat addiction or create employment. Monitoring should be proportionate, time-limited and combined with human supervision and services.

    5.4 Introduce transparent earned progression

    For eligible determinate sentences, movement through custody and into supervised release should depend partly on engagement, conduct and risk reduction. Rules must be clear at sentence, not invented during a capacity crisis. Serious violent, sexual and terrorist offences require distinct safeguards and, in appropriate cases, Parole Board scrutiny.

    Earned progression is defensible because it creates incentives and makes release preparation continuous. It is not defensible if “good behaviour” merely means passive compliance in a prison that offers no courses or work. The state must provide meaningful opportunities before it conditions progression on taking them.

    5.5 Repair probation and reduce churn

    Prison reform can fail by moving an unmanageable caseload through the gate. Probation needs stable staffing, manageable caseloads, specialist domestic-abuse and sexual-offending capacity, treatment access and timely enforcement.

    Recall should protect the public when risk materially increases, but avoidable technical breach and administrative delay should not create a revolving door. Government should publish recall reasons, time spent recalled and outcomes in sufficient detail to distinguish necessary protection from system churn.

    5.6 Reduce unnecessary remand

    Almost 18% of prisoners in England and Wales were on remand in July 2026. Some present risks that only custody can manage. Others remain because cases are delayed or because safe accommodation and supervised bail are unavailable. Investment in court capacity, bail information, supported housing and electronic monitoring can reduce unnecessary detention without weakening public protection.

    Remand reform also matters for legitimacy: people awaiting trial have not been convicted, while those awaiting sentence may ultimately receive a non-custodial disposal or a term shorter than time already served.

    5.7 Turn prisons into release institutions

    Most prisoners will return to the community. Public safety therefore depends on what happens before and after the gate. Each prisoner should have a coordinated plan covering identification, benefits, housing, physical and mental health, substance treatment, family contact, education and work. Progress should be measured, and agencies should share accountability for failures.

    The Norwegian principle of “normality”—life inside should resemble lawful life outside as far as security permits—is valuable because release requires ordinary capabilities. Responsibility, appointments, work and constructive relationships are not indulgences. They are practice for citizenship.

    5.8 Preserve genuine headroom

    Official capacity is not safe operating capacity. Cells become unavailable through maintenance, violence, segregation needs and population mix. A national reserve should therefore be defined as a percentage of usable, staffed places and protected by escalation rules. Crossing thresholds should trigger published ministerial actions well before emergency conditions.

    Construction remains necessary to replace dilapidated accommodation and meet irreducible demand. But new places should not become a licence for further sentence inflation. Capital plans must include staffing, health care and purposeful activity; otherwise Britain builds warehouses rather than functioning prisons.

    6. Public safety, victims and the strongest objections

    “Reform means dangerous people will be released”

    It should not. A serious reform plan differentiates by offence, risk and sentence type. It reserves prison for people who require confinement and applies enhanced scrutiny to high-risk release. Reducing short custody for low-risk cases can protect capacity for the people who genuinely need to be held.

    “Longer sentences deter crime”

    The certainty of detection and proportionate punishment may deter. It does not follow that every increase in sentence length produces a matching safety gain. Marginal years are expensive, may have diminishing deterrent value and can make eventual reintegration harder. Government should be required to demonstrate the expected benefit of sentence increases, not merely their symbolic force.

    “Community orders are soft”

    Poorly enforced orders are weak; well-designed ones are demanding. Restrictions, frequent reporting, treatment, work and monitoring can impose real punishment while preserving the stabilising factors that reduce offending. Breach must have swift, proportionate consequences.

    “Britain is not Norway or Japan”

    Correct—and it does not need to be. The proposal is not cultural imitation. It is to adopt tested mechanisms, adapt them to domestic law, pilot them, publish outcomes and stop policies that fail. The relevant question is not whether Britain can become Norway; it is why Britain should keep running prisons at emergency pressure when other democracies show that different equilibria are possible.

    Victims must not be an afterthought

    Predictable release rules, timely notification and clear licence conditions are essential. Victims should be told what the sentence means at the outset and informed of material changes. Restorative justice should be available only when genuinely voluntary and safe. Savings from reduced custody should partly fund victim services, because penal reform loses legitimacy if it appears to transfer every benefit to the offender while externalising harm.

    7. Measuring whether reform works

    Prison population reduction is a means, not the ultimate outcome. A public dashboard should track:

    • proven reoffending at consistent one- and two-year intervals;
    • frequency and seriousness of reoffending, not just whether any offence occurred;
    • compliance and completion for each community intervention;
    • victim satisfaction, notification and protection outcomes;
    • deaths, self-harm, violence and use of force in custody;
    • hours out of cell, education, treatment and employment;
    • housing and employment after release;
    • racial, sex and age disparities;
    • prison and probation staffing; and
    • full fiscal cost across justice, health, housing and benefits.

    Reforms should be phased and evaluated with credible comparison groups where possible. Results should be published even when disappointing. Norway’s or Japan’s headline rate cannot substitute for domestic evidence.

    Conclusion: govern the pipeline, not the panic

    England and Wales are not short of emergency ingenuity. They are short of a durable rule connecting sentencing policy to safe capacity. When that connection breaks, government alternates between expensive construction and hurried release, while staff, victims, prisoners and communities absorb the consequences.

    Norway shows the value of limiting institutional custody and making supervised alternatives ordinary. Japan shows that low occupancy can follow a sustained fall in admissions and that demographic and social policy matter to penal outcomes. Oklahoma shows how punitive laws can build a high-incarceration system—and how reform must address the front door rather than depend on relief at the back.

    The responsible reform position is neither “release everyone” nor “build forever”. It is to imprison fewer people unnecessarily, confine dangerous people safely, make every sentence intelligible, invest in supervision and reintegration, and operate with enough headroom that release dates are governed by law and risk rather than the number of empty cells on a Tuesday night.

    That is not softness. It is the harder discipline of making punishment effective, proportionate and governable.